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Job matching models provide a framework that connects turnover decisions to wages. 
These models therefore provide a possible explanation for the gender wage gap through the 
effect on wages of differences in turnover behavior by sex. But if job matching is to be an 
explanation of the wage gap then matching must differ by sex. This paper investigates 
patterns of job matching by sex and education level. Multinomial probit estimates of the 
probability of job-to-job and job-to-nonemployment turnover are obtained using a recently 
developed simulated maximum likelihood method. These estimates are in turn used to 
estimate implied reservation wages by sex and education group. Tests for equality of the 
turnover probabilities and reservation wages of men and women are conducted. It is found 
that differences between women's and men's turnover is primarily accounted for by the 
behavior of less educated women. The equality of the job turnover patterns of men and 
women with greater than a high school education cannot be rejected. 
Keywords: Turnover, Job Matching, Male-Female Wage Gap, Reservation Wage, 
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DOES JOB MATCHING DIFFER BY SEX? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The average wage of women has been between 60 % and 70 % of that of men for 
much of the 20th century (Goldin [ 1990], Marini [1989]) although recent evidence has 
pointed to a narrowing of the wage gap by the early 1980's (Blau and Beller [1988], Smith 
and Ward [1984]). In the sample of young people in the 1980's that is used in this paper, 
this gender wage gap has still not been eliminated. 
Several ways that the labor market behavior of men and women may differ are often 
proposed in studies of the labor market experiences of men and women and are often pointed 
to as the most likely sources of the unexplained wage gap. For instance, such studies 
emphasize maternity leaves, the current societal expectation that women are primarily 
responsible for child-raising, and the traditional status of wives as secondary earners in the 
household. These observations have prompted several "turnover explanations" of the gender 
wage gap. For example, investigations have been made into the effect of intermittent labor 
force participation on wages through its effect on human capital investment. This research 
has resulted in no consensus on the size or significance of these effects (Mincer and Polachek 
[1974], Corcoran and Duncan [1979], Corcoran [1979], Gronau [1988]). A second 
"turnover explanation" of the wage gap suggests that lower expected tenure might cause 
lower female wages if employers face fixed training or other personnel costs (Donohue 
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[1988]). In this paper, I suggest job matching as yet a third "turnover explanation" of the 
male-female wage gap. 
Observed levels of job tenure and labor market experience are the result of an 
individual's decisions about whether or not to work and whether or not to stay at the same 
job. Recent theoretical and empirical work on job matching and· search explores the labor 
market mechanisms that generate observed levels of tenure and experience. These matching 
models describe an optimal job turnover process and a consequent positive impact on wages. 
These models provide a framework that connects turnover decisions to wages. They 
therefore also provide a possible explanation for wage differences between men and women 
due to differences in turnover behavior and a framework with which to analyze these 
differences. 
Concentrating on the process of job matching for men and women may help identify 
to what extent matching differs by sex, whether any such differences affect wages, and 
whether or not women are compensated equally for similar labor market behaviors as men. 
Or more succinctly, "Can differences in job matching behavior help explain the male-female 
wage gap?" In this paper, rather than trying to estimate directly the effect of matching 
decisions on wages, I will look at the question at hand in a more indirect way. If job match­
ing is to help explain the wage gap, then matching behavior must differ by sex. The 
question asked here, therefore, is more simply "Are there differences in the job matching 
behavior of men and women?" 
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I will address this question by looking at men and women by education level. 
Education is an important determinant of wages and the size of the gender wage gap varies 
by education level. Additionally, studies of the turnover of women have obtained 
contradictory results on the effect of education on women's job turnover. These points 
suggest that looking at turnover and job matching for men and women by education level 
may provide evidence on the extent to which any of the "turnover explanations" described 
above may indeed explain the male-female wage gap. 
Dividing the sample along this dimension also allows some criterion for how well 
these "turnover explanations" do in explaining the wage gap. The education levels I use in 
the analysis are less than or equal to high school (LHS) and greater than high school (GHS). 
A wage gap exists for both groups. In my sample the ratio of the mean wage of less 
educated females (LHSF) to that of less educated males (LHSM) is 0. 79. This ratio for the 
more highly educated group is 0.86. If turnover is to account for a large portion of the wage 
gap, then differences in turnover for men and women should be found for both education 
groups. However, the wage gap between more highly educated men and women is smaller 
than that of less educated men and women. Therefore it is expected that job matching or 
other differences in job turnover will vary more for less educated men and women than for 
the more highly educated groups if turnover plays an important role in explaining the wage 
gap. 
A general test of wage gap "turnover explanations" is accomplished by testing for the 
equality of job-to-job and job-to-nonemployment turnover probabilities for men and women. 
Estimated probabilities are generated from multinomial probit (MNP) estimations of job 
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turnover. A MNP framework with unrestricted correlation structures is made feasible 
through recent work in simulated estimation methods. A more specific test of the job 
matching "turnover explanation" of the wage gap is conducted by testing for the equality by 
sex of estimated job-to-job and job-to-nonemployment reservation wages. The job matching 
explanation for the wage gap is described in more detail in the following section (Section II) 
and the method used to obtain reservation wages estimates is described briefly in Section III 
and in more detail in Section VII. Average turnover patterns are documented in Section IV. 
A model of turnover is presented in Section V and the results of estimating this model are 
reported in Section VI. Section VIII discusses possible bias in the estimates and conclusions 
are found in Section IX. 
Il. MATCHING, MEN, and WOMEN 
Matching and search are related aspects of the process by which workers locate a 
good job match through time on the job (matching) or time in the labor market (search). 
Both on-the-job search and matching are based on a worker's opportunities to change jobs in 
his or her quest for higher wages. The implications of both theories for wages grow out of 
optimal turnover behavior (Johnson [1978], Burdett [1978], Jovanovic [1979, 1984], 
Viscusi [1980a]). Previous studies of the wages of men and women, in focussing on tenure 
and experience profiles and returns to other human capital investments such as training, have 
acknowledged the importance of the decisions and labor market moves made early in a 
worker's career. Work on matching has also emphasized early career "job shopping" in 
relation to wage growth (Johnson [1978], Viscusi [1980a]). Such considerations suggest 
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exploring the importance of matching for men and women, especially young men and 
women. 
Differences in the labor market behavior of men and women may occur for many 
reasons, with women's traditional home and family responsibilities primary among these 
reasons. Such differences can be interpreted in terms of job matching models and in this 
way the importance of possible differences in the labor market behavior of men and women 
can be measured. The frequency of the untested attribution of the unexplained wage gap to 
these reasons, combined with a policy interest in closing the wage gap if it is due to labor 
market discrimination, make it a useful task to determine whether these reasons are indeed a 
primary determinant of the gender wage gap. 
How might these possible differences in the behavior of men and women be 
understood in the matching framework? The optimal turnover behavior used in these models 
is assumed to be unconstrained and unaffected by any individual heterogeneity in the value of 
non-market time. The wage gains due to matching that are predicted are based on 
unconstrained workers who have no reason to be in the nonemployment state other than to 
search for a good job. If the job turnover of a woman is constrained, for example, by her 
husband's location, she may not achieve equal wage gains due to matching as a similar man. 
A woman who leaves the labor force temporarily to have children may stop the job matching 
or on-the-job search process at the economically "wrong" time thereby losing out on some of 
the potential gains to matching. 1 Matching models therefore provide an appropriate 
1"Right" and "wrong" are here used in relation to the optimal separation strategy as defined by traditional 
matching and search models. As stated above, these models assume no mobility constraints and do not account for 
the value of non-market time. If workers do have constraints on mobility then these models are incorrectly specified, 
and the decision predicted as "right" is not the correct one for that individual. Women may have more of such 
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framework with which to tackle these issues. With these possible interpretations of the 
models in mind, I now turn to a discussion of how to test for differences in the job matching 
behavior of men and women. 
III. TESTING THE JOB MATCHING BEHAVIOR OF MEN AND WOMEN 
The defining feature of job matching models is the reservation wage property that a 
worker leaves the firm if the wage falls below some reservation value and stays on the job 
otherwise. The existence of a reservation wage gives the model its predictive power. Tests 
for differences in the matching behavior of men and women must therefore look to the 
reservation wage profile as the definitive aspect of such behavior. This paper uses observed 
turnover behavior to estimate reservation wage profiles for men and women by education 
level and, by testing for the equality of reservation wages, tests whether or not matching 
differs by sex and education level. 
First, I will provide a brief overview of the theory of matching with particular 
emphasis on the importance of the reservation wage. 2 The prototypical job-matching model 
is developed in Jovanovic [1979] and is summarized in Mortensen [1986]. Each worker-firm 
match is assumed to be unique and the productivity of the worker at one job is independent 
of that worker's productivity at any other job. Noisy measures of this match-specific 
productivity are observed during each period on the job. Through these observations, the 
constraints and therefore estimation of the model for women may produce estimates that are different from those for 
men. 
The discussion here will center on job matching as opposed to job search but the empirical work is formulated 
to encompass on-the-job search behavior as well. For an overview of search models, see Devine and Kiefer (1991]. 
2
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worker and firm learn about the productivity of their match. Because of the assumptions of 
an infinite horizon, risk neutrality, and independent productivity draws from a common 
distribution across job matches, the value of quitting the current job and taking a new job 
offer is constant over time. Because of the Bayesian learning framework used and the 
assumption that the wage paid to the worker will be the current conditional expectation of 
productivity based on all past productivity observations on this job, the problem becomes an 
optimal stopping problem. The worker decides whether and when to stop working at the 
current job. Since the value of quitting is constant while the value of staying increases with 
the wage, this problem has the reservation wage property -- that is, the worker leaves the 
firm if the wage falls below the reservation value for that level of tenure and stays 
otherwise. 3 
The empirical implications of the model result from this reservation wage property. 
The distribution of wages given tenure on the job becomes a coajitional distribution, the con­
dition being that the wage in each previous period on the job exceeded the reservation wage 
for that period. The prediction of the model for the effect of wages and tenure on the 
probability of quitting the job are also based on this reservation wage property. For 
example, the probability of leaving the current job is predicted to decrease with higher 
current wages. The learning structure of the model implies autocorrelation of a worker's 
wages at a particular job. Therefore, if the current wage is high, future wages are less likely 
to fall below the reservation wage and the worker is less likely to leave that job.4 
3See Flinn [1986] for a clear illustration of these results. 
For a more detailed summary of this and other matching and search models see Mortensen [1986] . 
4
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Matching models predict wage growth with job tenure and search models predict 
wage growth with labor market experience -- tenure and experience being accumulated 
according to the matching and search decisions made by the individual. Therefore, if there 
are differences in the matching and on-the-job search processes by sex, these processes could 
contribute to the male-female wage gap. In this paper I look at job matching behavior by sex 
and education level in order to explore the question of whether or not job matching 
contributes to the gender wage gap. If matching is to play a major role in explaining the 
male-female wage gap, I would expect to find differences in job matching by sex for both 
education groups analyzed since there exists a gender wage gap for both groups. As 
discussed in the Introduction, the wage gap is greater for less educated women. Therefore, a 
matching explanation of the wage gap implies larger differences in job matching for less 
educated men and women than for more highly educated men and women. 
Taking optimal matching behavior as given, observed turnover behavior implies a 
reservation wage profile. I proceed by assuming three possible states: leaving the current 
job for a new job; leaving the current job for nonemployment; and staying on the current 
job. A worker will leave the job for a new job if the new wage offer exceeds the reservation 
offer and the value of nonemployment. A worker will leave the job for nonemployment if 
the current wage falls below the reservation wage for the current level of tenure and 
experience and no acceptable alternative job offer is available. By definition, the reservation 
wage is the wage at which the worker is indifferent between staying on the job and leaving 
the job for nonemployment. Also by definition, the reservation offer is the offer at which 
the worker is indifferent between staying at the current job and taking a new job offer. My 
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goal is to estimate the reservation wages and offers of men and women but reservation wages 
and offers are not directly observed. I have only discrete information on which state is 
chosen. As will be described in detail in Section VII, for the purposes of estimation the in­
difference concept can be alternatively expressed in terms of turnover probabilities. The 
estimated reservation wage (offer) is the wage (offer) at which the probability of staying on 
the job is equal to the probability of leaving the job for nonemployment (a new job). 
The estimation strategy of this paper is as follows. Multinomial probit estimates of 
turnover equations are first used to generate predicted probabilities of job-to-job (JJ) and job­
to-nonemployment (JNE) turnover holding constant the wage, job tenure, labor market 
experience, and other variables expected to influence the reservation wage and the 
reservation offer. These estimates are obtained using a recently developed simulated 
maximum likelihood method. The model and its estimates are presented in Section V. 
Given the estimated parameters of the turnover equations, calculating turnover probabilities 
at a series of wage levels allows identification of the wage at which the probability of staying 
on the job equals that of leaving to a new job (JJ reservation wage or wR ) and the wage at 
J 
which the probability of staying on the job equals the probability of moving into 
nonemployment (the JNE reservation wage or wR ). These equalizing wages are the
N 
estimates of the JJ and JNE reservation wages. Section VII describes this procedure and the 
estimates it generates. 
If matching models are appropriate models of turnover behavior, then observed job 
turnover will imply a reservation wage profile as described above. If these models do not 
adequately describe the turnover behavior of either men or women, then the implied 
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reservation wage profile will differ from the optimal path that arises from matching theory. 
These implied reservation wage and offer profiles will be estimated for men and women by 
education group. If differences by group are found in these profiles, the approach used here 
does not explain what causes the differences. Different preferences on the part of men and 
women would cause different reservation wages by sex. Differences in firm demand for 
workers by sex that affects alternative job offers would be reflected in the reservation wage 
estimated with this method. Any differences in the matching process by sex, be they caused 
by individual choices, institutional constraints, or discrimination, will affect the reservation 
wage profiles estimated by this method. Only if the matching process is as defined in the 
prototypical models will these estimates be true estimates of the reservation wage profile. As 
the goal of this paper is to test whether or not the matching processes of men and women are 
the same, this shortcoming is not a problem. What is needed is simply a method for 
summarizing the implications of matching theory in order to perform such a test. The 
reservation wage is the most appropriate summary of the behavior described in matching 
models. 
IV. AVERAGE TURNOVER BY SEX AND EDUCATION 
Before turning to this model and its estimation, it will be useful to summarize average 
turnover probabilities and to survey previous findings on male and female turnover. Figures 
Al-A12 in Appendix A are graphs of turnover profiles for a subsample of the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) young men and women. Included in this subsample 
are men and women from the random sample who were at least 22 years old at the time of 
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the interview. Interview years 1980-1987 are pooled. The subsample consists of 10,354 
observations on men and 9856 on women. The data are described in more detail in 
Appendix D. Figures Al-A4 illustrate job-to-job turnover against age, experience, tenure, 
and the real wage on the current job.5 Similarly, Figures A5-A8 and A9-A12 illustrate job­
to-nonemployment transitions and the percentage staying at the same job. Some of the most 
interesting graphs are also pictured in the text. 
These figures show that when plotted against age, experience, or the wage level, men 
have higher job-to-job (JJ) turnover than do women. JJ turnover ranges from about 12 % to 
about 25% when plotted by age, with men's turnover generally about 2-4 points above 
women's. When plotted against tenure, JJ turnover does not differ significantly by sex. 
Average JJ turnover at a tenure level of less than one year is approximately 25% but falls to 
less than 10% by the time a worker reaches six years of tenure. Keep in mind that the 
differential turnover rates that are observed by age affect the distribution of tenure by sex. 
The turnover patterns illustrated in these figures conform generally to theory. JJ 
turnover is monotonically declining with age, tenure, and the wage for both men and women. 
Both human capital and job matching models predict declining turnover with job tenure.6 
Matching models also predict that turnover will decrease with higher wages if the wage is a 
5Age is the individual's age on January l of the given interview year. Experience is actual labor market 
experience calculated from detailed work history data of the individual up to the interview date. Tenure is the 
number of years spent with the current employer. For the graphs, both tenure and experience are rounded down. 
The real wage is the worker's reported wage adjusted by the CPI index so that all wages are in terms of 1979 
dollars. For the graphs, the real wage is rounded to the nearest dollar. 
6The matching theory of Jovanovic (1979] actually predicts that turnover will first increase and then will 
decrease with tenure as learning occurs. The length of time of the initial increase may be so short that it cannot be 
captured in this data. 
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good proxy for the value of the current 
Job-to-Job Turnover 
30job match. These patterns are reflected 
25 
in the tenure-turnover and wage-turnover 
20 
graphs. It is also interesting to note in 15 
Figure 1 the inverted-CT shape of the 
10 
experience-turnover profile for both men 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Experienc11 
-+- Mole --- remole 
7 8 9 10 
and women. An inverted-CT shape for the Figure 1 
tenure profile in JJ turnover is predicted 
by Jovanovic's learning model of job matching. Jovanovic's model does not address general 
learning with time in the labor market. This JJ turnover by experience graph (Figure 1) may 
suggest that learning is affecting job turnover in a manner similar to that predicted in 
Jovanovic's model but that the effect is stronger in the experience than in the tenure 
dimension. 
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Job-to-Nonemployment (JNE) turnover looks very different than JJ turnover.7 JNE 
turnover graphed against age stands out as 
illustrating large differences in turnover 
Job to Non-Employment Turnover 
22 
by sex. As seen in Figure 2, men show a 20 
18 
definite declining pattern with age: 18 % 
at age 22 to about 10% by age 29. 
Women's JNE turnover on the other hand 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
Age 
shows only a modest decline: from 21 % -+- Mole -- f emole 
Figure 2 at age 22 to 17% at age 29. The 
difference by sex is attenuated when graphed against tenure but the lower turnover to 
nonemployment for men continues to be significant. When plotted against experience and the 
wage, however, these sex differences are erased. Again it should be noted that the higher 
JNE turnover of women causes a different distribution of men and women by experience 
level. The experience, tenure, and wage profiles illustrate monotonic declines in turnover 
although diminishing precision at higher ages and wages make it impossible to rule out 
upturns. 
The higher JJ turnover of men and the higher JNE turnover of women are offsetting 
influences, causing differences in the average percentage of male and female workers staying 
7Nonemployment includes observations on both those individuals who report themselves as unemployed and 
those who report themselves to be out of the labor force (OLF). The NLSY work history data define such a 
distinction but when a nonemployed spell includes time both unemployed and OLF, the exact time period assigned to 
each is arbitrary. Therefore it is difficult to identify with confidence the destination -- unemployed or OLF -- of a 
person leaving employment. In this paper both are therefore included in the larger category called nonemployed. 
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on the job at any given age, experience, 
% Staying on the Job 
90or tenure to be insignificant. 8 Indeed, 
80 
these profiles look remarkably similar by 70 
60 
sex. For example, as shown in Figure 3, 
50 
40 
during their first year of labor market 
30 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Experience 
experience 39 % of women and 41 % of 
-1- Mole --- Femole 
men will stay at the same job. By the Figure 3 
time they reach 8 years of experience the 
percentages are 76% of women and 78% of men. The stay-wage profile (Figure A12) on the 
other hand shows a slightly higher but usually significant percentage of women staying on the 
job than men for a given wage. 
These results are not at odds with other comparisons of male and female job quit rates 
although other studies have not distinguished between the type of quit -- job-to-job or job-to­
nonemployment -- and therefore do not illustrate some of the outcomes shown here. For 
example, declining turnover with tenure is usually found for both men and women just as 
these figures show. On the other hand, Donohue [1988] finds a U-shaped job quit hazard for 
women in his early (1968-71) cohort and in a low-tenure sample from the Equal Employment 
Opportunities Pilot Program Survey, Meitzen [1986] finds that the probability of a woman's 
quitting the job increases with tenure. Several of these studies (for example, Light and Ureta 
[1992] and Donohue [1988]) find that the negative tenure effect is stronger for men than for 
women. 
8See Figures A9-A12 in Appendix A. 
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Some of the previous studies also examine the effect of wages on turnover and find a 
negative effect of the wage on turnover for both men and women. In his logit analysis, 
Viscusi [1980b] finds the marginal effect of the wage on the probability of quitting the job to 
be equal for men and women, while Light and Ureta [1992] in a discrete-time hazard study 
find the negative wage effect to be stronger for women than for men. 
Studies of men's mobility (see, for example, Mincer and Jovanovic [1981]) have 
found that education is negatively correlated with turnover. Comparisons of men and women 
have differed in their findings. Donohue [1988] and Light and Ureta [1992] find that 
education has a negative effect on the quit rate of both men and women. Blau and Kahn 
[1981] and Viscusi [1980b] find an insignificant effect for education on the quit rate of men 
and a positive effect for that of women. These conflicting results suggest the need for 
further inquiry into the relationship between education and women's turnover patterns. 
When I divide my sample of young men and women by education level, it becomes 
apparent that the average turnover patterns reported above are masking some potentially 
important differences among women. Figures A13-A24 report the same turnover profiles 
discussed above broken down by education level. 9 The education levels used are less than 
or equal to high school (LHS) and greater than high school (GHS). Abbreviations used 
throughout the text are LHSM (males with education of high school or less), GHSM (males 
with greater than high school education), LHSF (females with education of high school or 
9The sample sizes are as follows: LHS-Female 4792 observations, OHS-Female 5064 observations, LHS-Male 
6018 observations, and OHS-Male 4336 observations. 
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less), and GHSF (females with greater than high school education). Again, the most 
interesting of the figures are reproduced in the text. 
These graphs by education level illustrate that the differences in male and female job­
to-job turnover discussed above are accounted for mainly by differences in the JJ turnover of 
less educated women. Less educated 
women (LHSF) have lower average levels 
Job-to-Job Turnover 
of JJ turnover than more highly educated 
28 
Males and Females by Education Level 
26 
women (GHSF) by age, experience, ten­ .22 
~20 







generally significant by women's 10 
8 
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H 
Age 
education group at the 95 % level except 
---,.._ LHS-M --+-- CHS-M ---e- LHS-F ---- CHS-F 
in the case of tenure. Figure 4 illustrates Figure 4 
JJ turnover by age for these groups. The 
JJ turnover of LHS women is about 4 percentage points lower than GHS women at each age 
level. Women with greater than a high school education, on the other hand, look very much 
like men in their JJ turnover patterns. 
The job-to-nonemployment turnover graphs again highlight differences between less 
educated women and all others. In particular, Figure 5 shows that LHS women have a JNE 
turnover rate that is approximately 7 percentage points higher than GHS women at each age 
level. In other words, the JNE average transition rate of less educated women is 40-85 % 
higher, depending on the age level, than that of higher educated women. The differences 
between LHS women and all others are smaller but still significant in the tenure, experience, 
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and wage profiles. Once again, more 
Job-to-Nonemployment Turnover 
highly educated women look very similar 
26 
Males and Females by Education Level 
24 








Lower JJ turnover and higher JNE 8 
6 
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
Age 
turnover of LHS women relative to all 
--¥-- LHS-M -+- CHS-4.1 -e- LHS-f ---- CHS-f 
others balance one another to just about Figure 5 
equalize their overall quit rates with those 
of the other three groups. The average percentage of each group who stay at the same job is 
very similar for men and women of all education levels. By age level, the lower 11 stay 11 rate 
for LHS women as compared to GHS women is marginally significant at the 95 % level for 
some age levels. By experience and tenure the differences in "stay" rates for women by 
education level are generally insignificant. At low wage levels LHS women have higher 
"stay 11 probabilities while at higher wage levels the differences are insignificant. 11 
The fact that average turnover by education for women ·looks so different for the 
different types of transition might explain why previous studies have obtained conflicting 
results on the effect of education on the turnover of women. When the type of turnover is 
not accounted for, the result is ambiguous depending on whether the higher turnover to 
nonemployment of lower educated women outweighs the higher job-to-job turnover of more 
highly educated women, or vice-versa. Again, these figures represent only simple averages 
10See Appendix A, Figures A 17-A20 for these graphs. 
11See Appendix A, Figures A21-A24. 
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but the large differences between women of different education levels for different types of 
job transitions suggest that there may be some important unexplored differences in job 
matching behavior among women. 
V. MODEL OF TURNOVER 
The model is based on the job-to-job and job-to-nonemployment turnover equations 
that follow from the extended matching model as set forth in Jovanovic [1984].12 The wage 
of worker i at time t on the current job j is wijt• The new wage offer of firm k to worker i at 
time tis: 
(1) 
The wage offer is assumed to depend on labor market experience, X, both due to job search 
and due to general human capital accumulation with experience. I assume that worker-firm 
matches differ in their productivity and that the true productivity of the match is unknown 
when a worker begins a new job. Workers and firms observe some measure of productivity 
each period but this measure is only a noisy signal of the true productivity of the match. 
Workers and firms update their assessments of the true value of their match using the 
imperfect observations that are available. Therefore workers and firms are learning about the 
true value of match-specific productivity as tenure on the job increases. Wages are based on 
the current assessment of productivity. The wage offer of firm k includes a random factor, 
<l>ikt that represents the initial assessment of the value of match ik (worker i to firm k). This 
12See Topel [1986] for an implementation of a matching model that includes only job-to-job turnover. 
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draw of <Pikt is assumed to be independent of previous draws of ¢ implying that alternative 
offers for the same individual are independent of one another. 
The reservation offer of worker i at time t is:13 
Ro =A; +AJ w +~J r +o/ (2)il . y O .y w ijt .y T' it it' 
where Wi;t 
, 
is the current wage and Tit is tenure on the current job. 14 0/.ll is an unobservable 
shock that is (for now) assumed to be iid and normal across individuals and time. The 
matching model predicts that the reservation offer will be increasing in the current wage, so 
y w should be positive. Clearly it is expected that a worker with a relatively high current 
wage would require a relatively high outside offer in order to change jobs. The matching 
model also suggests that the reservation offer is negatively related to tenure on the job. This 
result follows from the Bayesian learning structure of the model which allows greater poten­
tial for wage growth early in a job. As tenure on the job increases, more is known about 
true match-specific productivity and therefore less chance remains for wage growth. The 
same current wage at a higher level of tenure therefore represents a less valuable potential 
future wage stream. The offer at which the worker is indifferent between the current job and 
a new job (the JJ reservation offer) will therefore decrease with tenure holding constant the 
wage on the current job. Equations (1) and (2) imply that a worker will leave the current job 
for a new job if 
13Note that "J" superscripts indicate a reference to the job-changing equation as opposed to "N" superscripts 
which will indicate the job-to-nonemployment equation. 
14Other variables expected to influence the reservation offer such as union status and bad health are included in 
the empirical work. 
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(3) 
Additionally, a worker will leave the job for nonemployment if the value of the 
current job falls below some reservation value. If the current wage is an accurate reflection 
of the value of the current job, 15 this reservation value can be called the reservation wage 
and is expressed as follows: 
(4) 
The vector Z;1 includes variables such as asset income and health status that are thought to 
affect the value of nonemployment. aN. is analogous to cl. above. Equation (4) impliesu u 
that the worker will leave the job for nonemployment if 
(5) 
Equations (3) and (5) summarize the turnover behavior of workers. 16 
Previous studies of the labor market outcomes of men and women have suggested 
several reasons that the turnover of men and women may differ. In particular, men and 
women have traditionally adopted different roles on the job and at home. If such traditional 
15The empirical work includes other variables such as union status and job tenure which may contribute to the 
value of the job. 
16In Jovanovic's [1984] three state matching model (Jovanovic [1984]) nonemployment is used only as a vehicle 
for generating a higher offer arrival rate. Therefore, with an acceptable offer in hand, a worker would never choose 
to leave the job for nonemployment and theoretically we need only specify two equations describing turnover, 
equations (3) and (5). This paper, however, acknowledges additional reasons for leaving the job to nonemployment 
and therefore includes in the vector Z variables such as asset income which are thought to affect this choice. Given 
the choice of nonemployment for reasons other than search, a second inequality for each possible type of transition 
will be specified. For example, a new job must be preferred both to staying on the current job and to leaving the job 
for nonemployment. These restrictions are included when the estimations are described below in terms of the 
standard discrete choice framework with three alternatives. 
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roles are still valid descriptions of the behavior of men and women in the 1980's, we would 
expect to find different preferences for work versus nonemployment for men and women. 
These preferences will be expressed in terms of the model most explicitly in equation (5) 
describing JNE turnover. A second major difference that historically has been ascribed to 
men and women is a wife's customary status as a secondary earner in the married household. 
This, combined with greater home work responsibilities for women, may mean that there are 
omitted variables such as a spouse's job transfer or the presence of disabled family members 
that should appear in the women's turnover equation but that are unimportant for men. If so, 
the parameters estimated for women will suffer from an omitted variable bias that does not 
exist for men. Therefore, if these types of differences between men and women are 
important, the estimated parameters of this model should differ for males and females when 
estimations are carried out separately by group. 
The differences in male and female labor force behavior just described are often cited 
as possible causes of the unexplained male-female wage gap through the effects of turnover 
differences on the expected length of a job. It is speculated that tower expected tenure might 
cause lower female wages if employers face fixed training or other personnel costs (Donohue 
[1988]). The literature on job matching suggests that there are other avenues by which 
turnover may affect wages. These models tie wages to turnover in ways other than simply 
through expected job duration. In these models optimal turnover leads directly to higher 
expected wages. In either case, the relationship between turnover and the wage gap is 
dependent on assumed turnover differences between men and women. I seek to test whether 
or not those differences are significant for young people in the 1,80's. 
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For the purposes of estimation, the two turnover equations ((3) and (5)) can be 
written in a standard multinomial discrete choice framework as follows: 
Y1 =Qo1 +E1 
(6)Y2=Qo2+E2 
y3=Qo3+E3 
where the first equation in (6) represents the value of a new job, the second equation is the 
value of nonemployment, and the third equation in (6) represents the value of staying at the 
current job. If (y1 > y2) and (y1 > y3), the worker moves from the current job to a new 
job, referred to here as a JJ transition. If (y2 > y1) and (y2 > y3), the worker moves from 
the current job to nonemployment, a JNE transition. If (y3 > y1) and (y3 > y2), then the 
worker stays at the current job. Since the alternatives are judged relative to each other, the 
problem reduces to two equations: 
Y1 -y3 =Q(o1-03) +(E1 -E3) (7) 
Y2 -y3 =Q(o2-03) +CE2-E3). 
Written in this way, the relationship between the estimating equations and the model 
described above becomes clearer. For example, (o1 - 03 ) =((3 -r' ) , and (o1 - 03 ) =-r' .0 0 0 0 w w w 
The error term relationships are (E -E )=(,1.._ -o/.) and (E -E )=aN.. An assumption of
I 3 '+'ik1 II 2 3 ll 
joint normality on the errors in (6) implies a multinomial probit (MNP) for the estimation of 
these turnover equations. A multinomial probit specification allows for flexible correlation 
structures across alternatives, unlike the restrictive assumptions necessitated by, for example, 
multinomial logit. More specifically, possible correlation structures of the MN.P include 
correlation between pairs of alternatives and, with panel data, individual random effects by 
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alternative or first order autoregressive processes in the errors. The smooth simulated 
maximum likelihood estimation method developed by Boersch-Supan and Hajivassiliou [1990] 
overcomes the computational difficulties caused by the high dimensional integrals called for 
in multinomial probit estimation, difficulties which until recently seriously deterred the use of 
these models in practice. Other simulation estimation methods for limited dependent variable 
models are reviewed in Hajivassiliou [1992]. 
The dependent variable for each observation is whether the worker left the job for a 
new job, left the job for nonemployment, or stayed on the current job during the time period 
under consideration. 17 The turnover transition probabilities being estimated are, therefore, 
only transitions that begin with a job. This definition of job turnover necessitates that a 
person be working in order to be included in the sample. Possible sample selection problems 
raised by this sample definition are discussed below. 
17Estimations have been carried out using samples defined over two different time intervals. The results 
discussed in the main body of the text use all the data available on the turnover of each individual. This sample 
definition allows an individual worker to have more than one observation per year ifs/he held more than one job 
during this year. For example, worker i in year t might be observed to leave Job # 1 for Job #2 (JJ decision) and to 
stay on Job #2 for the rest of that year (a decision to stay on the current job). The advantage of this sample 
definition is that it uses all the data on turnover available from the NLSY survey. The disadvantage of this sample 
definition is that each decision of each individual is not taking place within the same time interval since some 
workers (those who change jobs) are allowed more than one decision per year while other workers (those who do not 
change jobs) are allowed only one decision per year. The alternative sample definition used allows only one 
observation per year per individual. In the above example, only the JJ transition from Job #1 to Job #2 would be 
recorded for worker i in year t. The advantage of this sample definition is that all turnover decisions in the sample 
occur within time intervals of the same length. The disadvantage is that some known turnover data must be thrown 
away. The two sample definitions produce similar results and no differences occur in the tests for equality of 
turnover behavior across groups. Graphs of the results from the alternative sample definition are included in 
Appendix C. A sample definition that would combine the advantages of both of the two definitions just described is 
possible only if data on all variables is available at the same frequency as the data on job turnover. In the NLSY, 
after creating a job history as described in Appendix D, turnover data is available at a weekly frequency. It is not 
possible, however, to track other variables this closely since survey participants were asked about other job 
information only at yearly intervals. 
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Explanatory variables included in Q are tenure on the current job and its square, 
actual labor market experience and its square, health status, union status, the real wage on 
the current job and its square, asset income, marital status, and number of children. Note, 
however, that fertility and marriage decisions, particularly of women, may be related to 
unobservable components of the reservation wage, making the number of children and 
marital status endogenous. 18 Estimations were therefore run with and without number of 
children and marital status as explanatory variables. Although the coefficients on these varia­
bles are significant, the effects of other variables and the test results for these two 
specifications were qualitatively the same. Estimations with marital status and number of 
children included are discussed and graphed. Both sets of coefficients are reported in 
Appendix E. 
An alternative econometric approach that has been used in models of job turnover is 
duration analysis. I have chosen to use MNP instead for two main reasons. First, the 
discrete choice framework conforms more closely to the structural model presented above 
than does the actual implementation of a duration model. Since.~my estimates of the 
reservation wage (see Section VII) depend upon a structural interpretation of this model, the 
more easily interpretable MNP framework is preferable to the reduced form duration model. 
Second, the MNP allows more flexibility in estimating the error structure, both con­
temporaneous and temporal, of the discrete alternatives than duration analysis can handle in 
relation to the possible destination states in a competing risks model. Additionally, the most 
18See Rosenzweig and Schultz [ 1985] for a joint analysis of women's labor supply and fertility decisions and 
Browning [1992] for an overview of the effects of children on various aspects of household behavior. 
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often cited advantage of duration models over discrete choice models is that the estimated 
parameters do not change depending on the length of the time interval chosen for discrete 
analysis. This result depends on the assumption that the econometrician has continuous data 
on all variables. Since the NLSY data, like most other large panel surveys, include 
observations on most variables only at yearly intervals, the duration framework is not 
superior to MNP in this respect. 
Before turning to the estimation results, note that the first estimates reported do not 
take account of possible persistent unobservable individual heterogeneity. That is, the vector 
E in (6) is assumed to be independent across individuals and time. If instead E . =µ .+'YI . 
3u 31 ·1311 
where µ 
~ 
. represents the worker's preference for staying at the same job and is iid, then'YI .·,~ 
one would expect E to be positively correlated with tenure, since a preference for staying at
3 
the same job will have affected previous job-to-job turnover and therefore current tenure. A 
similar argument can be made for a negative correlation between E 
2 
and experience. Let c? 
T 
be the coefficient on tenure in the third equation of (6). If E is positively correlated with
3 
tenure, it is expected that 03 r will be biased upward. 
19 This problem and its affect on the 
group comparisons conducted here is discussed in more detail in Section VIII below. 
Further estimates are presented that attempt to correct for this problem by estimating 
the MNP model with unobservable random effects that are constant for the individual over 
time. Random effects can be used to represent the preference of the individual for staying at 
19This is the problem of "spurious state dependence" caused by "temporally persistent unobservables" analyzed 
by Heckman [1981b]. 
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the same job or for staying in the labor market thereby taking into account unobserved 
heterogeneity that is persistent for the same individual over time. When the possible 
correlation of these random effects with the explanatory variables is also taken into account, 
this procedure should eliminate the bias that might be caused by correlation of tenure or 
experience with the unobservables. 
VI. MNP ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Figures Bl-B9 in Appendix B summarize the first set of MNP estimates obtained by 
sex and education group. The coefficients estimated by MNP for JJ and JNE turnover 
relative to staying on the current job are presented in Tables El-E4 in Appendix E.20 It 
should be noted, however, that because the scale of the coefficients is not identified in MNP 
models and because, unlike in linear models, the effect of the coefficients on the probabilities 
depends on the levels of the explanatory variables, the probabilities graphed and reported in 
the text are the correct comparison across groups as opposed to the coefficients reported in 
these tables. 
The estimated probabilities graphed and discussed here are based on estimations that 
impose the restrictions that the variance of each error is fixed at unity and no correlation is 
allowed across alternatives. This independent probit assumption was imposed, however, only 
after tests could not reject this assumption. Although the independent probit assumption 
could not be rejected in this case, allowing for the possibility of correlation across 
20Two different specifications are presented. The first includes both number of children and marital status as 
explanatory variables. The second excludes these variables from the estimation. 
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alternatives is an important feature of the MNP specification used in this paper. The MNP 
framework allows that testing of the independence assumption rather than the forced 
imposition of this assumption required by the multinomial logit. 
Estimations are carried out separately for each of the four sex and education groups. 
Based on the average turnover rates reported above, only estimates by sex and education 
group will be discussed. The data are from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY). The sample used here includes interview years 1980-1987 of workers who were at 
least 22 years old at the time of the interview.21 The data are described in more detail in 
Appendix D. 
MNP estimations point to the importance of the wage in both types of turnover for all 
sex and education groups. This finding is in accordance with studies of the turnover of men 
such as Topel and Ward [1992]. Tenure and experience are also found to be important in 
determining turnover. The turnover probabilities graphed by the wage level, by tenure, and 
by experience will be graphed and described below. As shown in Table I and Table II, the 
MNP estimations also show that asset income increases the probability of both JJ and JNE 
turnover for all groups although these differences are significant only in the case of JNE 
turnover for both groups of women. The results shown in these two tables indicate that the 
inclusion of demand indicators in the form of dummy variables for the range of local 
unemployment rates also serves the purpose of providing a distinction between the two 
subcategories of nonemployment -- unemployment and out of the labor force. It is found that 
21This age cut off was used in order to avoid the endogenous sample selection of samples by education level 
that would result from letting a worker enter the sample as soon as he or she left school and entered the labor force. 
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high local unemployment rates significantly decrease the probability of JJ turnover for all 
four groups. However, while high unemployment increases the probability of JNE turnover 
for both groups of men, the effect for women is either insignificant or negative. I interpret 
this variation between men and women to be caused by a higher proportion of women's JNE 
turnover being a choice to leave the labor force with more men becoming unemployed. 
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Table I 
Estimated Job-to-Job Turnover Probabilities 
Evaluated at Different Levels of Selected 
Explanatory Variables 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
LHSM GHSM LHSF GHSF 
Asset Income = 0 0.177 0.186 0.134 0.167 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Asset Income = 0.179 0.197 0.145 0.184 
5000 (0.020) (0.010) (0.017) (0.015) 
Dummy for Local 0.216 0.219 0.169 0.198 
UE rate (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
:s; 6% = 1 
Dummy for Local 0.135 0.156 0.097 0.125 
UE rate > 12% (0.012) (0.017) (0.012) (0.014) 
=1 
Marital Status = 0 0.175 0.174 0.152 0.176 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) 
Marital Status = 1 · 0.171 0.205 0.117 0.147 
(0.008) (0.013) (0.007) (0.009) 
Number of 0.182 0.196 0.154 0.187 
Children = 0 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Number of 0.180 0.195 0.133 0.143 
Children = 1 (0.006) (0.012) (0.005) (0.010) 
*Other variables held constant at group means. 
LHSM: Males, less than or equal to high school education 
GHSM: Males, greater high school education 
LHSF: Females, less than or equal to high school education 
GHSF: Females, greater high school education 
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Table II 
Estimated Job-to-Nonemployment Turnover Probabilities 
Evaluated at Different Levels of Selected 
Explanatory Variables 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
LHSM GHSM LHSF GHSF 
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*Other variables held constant at group means. 
LHSM: Males, less than or equal to high school education 
GHSM: Males, greater high school education 
LHSF: Females, less than or equal to high school education 
GHSF: Females, greater high school education 
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Comparing the MNP turnover profiles by tenure, experience and the wage to the 
simple averages, I find that most of the 
patterns previously reported are repro­
Job-to-Job Turnover 
MNP Estimates 
0.22duced with this multivariate approach. In 
0.2 
~O.tB
particular, less educated women have :g.g 0.16 
~ 0.14 
0 0.12lower JJ turnover and higher JNE E 
~ 0.1 
0.08 
0.06turnover than the other groups when 
4 
Tenure 
-><- LHSM -+- CHSM -e- LHSF -a- CHSFgraphed against experience, tenure, and 
the wage. Graphs of these two types of Figure 6 
turnover against tenure are found in Figure 6 and Figure 7. 
The most notable difference between the simple averages and the MNP results occurs 
in the JNE versus tenure profile for LHS women. 
constant other variables such as labor 
market experience, the JNE turnover 
probability of LHS women first 
decreases, but then increases with tenure 
on the job (Figure 7). This stands in 
contrast to the JNE probability by tenure 
of the other groups, each of which shows 
a monotonically declining probability of 
turnover to nonemployment as tenure 
0.22 
0.2 
















--- LHSM -+- CHSM -e- LHSF --- CHSF 
increases. The same result shows up less dramatically in the stay-tenure profile (Figure BS) 
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where a downturn in the probability of staying on the job for LHS women occurs at about 
five years of tenure. The MNP estimates confirm the initial observation that less educated 
women differ significantly in their turnover decisions from more highly educated women. 
This observation as well as the similarity of the turnover patterns of higher educated 
women to those of men of both education levels can be confirmed by tests for the equality of 
the estimated turnover probabilities. Probabilities are calculated by group and the tested 
probabilities are evaluated at the group means. 22 As shown in Table III, with one 
exception, the equality of all three turnover probabilities for LHS women with all other 
groups is rejected. In the case of JJ turnover and the probability of staying on the job, 
equality cannot be rejected for the three other groups. Lastly, the equality of turnover 
probabilities for GHS men and women cannot be rejected for JJ turnover, JNE turnover, or 
for the probability of staying at the same job. 
Estimations were also conducted allowing for random effects (RE) for the same 
individual over time. That is, in (6) I let E . =µ .+11 . for each alternative k, where thekit kt ~11 
random effect µ is normal and iid across individuals and 'Y/ is normal and iid across 
individuals and time. 23 Both µ and 11 are assumed to have a mean of zero. The variances 
of two of the three random effects can be identified. 
22Since the probabilities are between O and 1, they are differentiable and their variances can be computed using 
the "delta method." 
23Due to the estimation program used, a balanced panel was necessary in order to perform these estimations. 
My sample is not a balanced panel. It was therefore artificially balanced by dropping observations on some 
individuals. The resulting balanced panel included four time periods with observations on 767 LHSM, 556 GHSM, 
597 LHSF, and 650 GHSF. Note that the process of creating a balanced panel is exogenous to the sample. 
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Table III 
Two-Tailed Tests for Equality of Turnover Probabilities 
Significance Level = 0.05 
Normal Test Statistic in Parentheses 
Job-to- Stay on 
Job-to-Job Nonemployment the Job 
Probability* Probability* Probability* 
LHS-M vs Do Not Reject Reject Do Not Reject 
GHS-M (0.317) (3.406) (1.421) 
LHS-M vs Reject Reject Do Not Reject 
LHS-F (5.696) (6.326) (1.277) 
LHS-M vs Do Not Reject Do Not Reject Do Not Reject 
GHS-F (0.270) (1.832) (2.469) 
GHS-M vs Reject Reject Reject 
LHS-F (5 .418) (9.132) (2.538) 
GHS-M vs Do Not Reject Do Not Reject Do Not Reject 
GHS-F (0.555) (1.580) (0.887) 
LHS-F vs Reject Reject Reject 
GHS-F (5.322) (7.835) (3.583) 
*Evaluated at group means. 
LHS-M: Males, less than or equal to high school education 
GHS-M: Males, greater high school education 
LHS-F: Females, less than or equal to high school education 
GHS-F: Females, greater high school education 
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Table IV 
Estimates of the Standard Deviations of 
Individual Random Effects 
(T-Statistics for Null Hypothesis that 
Standard Deviation Equals One in Parentheses) 
Estimated Standard Estimated Standard 
Deviation of RE Deviation of RE 
Means of Tenure & 
Experience Included 
in Estimation 
JI JNE JI JNE 
Equation Equation Equat1on Equation 
LHSM 1.125 1.149 1.111 1.163 
(0.819) (1.134) (0.637) (1.240) 
GHSM 1.008 1.244 1.015 1.241 
(0.045) (8.571) (0.914) (3.084) 
LHSF 1.016 1.241 1.021 1.239 
(0.118) (4.921) (0.156) (5.437) 
GHSF 1.017 1.240 1.001 1.246 
(0.199) (5.246) (0.005) (13.898) 
As illustrated in the second column of Table IV, for all groups except LHSM, the 
estimated standard deviation of the random effect in the JNE equation is significantly 
different from one. In contrast, the null hypothesis of CJ = 1 in the JI equation cannot be 
,,_JJ 
rejected for any of the four groups. 
In order to compare the RE specification with the previously reported results, one­
period probabilities were calculated by evaluating the probabilities at the mean of the random 
effects and adjusting the one-period standard deviation to account for the additional variance 
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term allowed in the random effect 
specification. 24 Comparing the RE 
model with the first set of results, I find 
first that the JJ turnover by tenure profile 
for LHSF changes with the addition of 
the random effects. Figure 8 shows that 
when random effects are included, the JJ 
turnover of this group turns up at about 
five years of tenure. 
More interestingly, I also find that 
the JNE turnover of LHSF looks more 
like that of the other three groups when 
RE's are included in the estimation. For 
example, Figure 9 shows that the JNE 
turnover by the real wage looks very 
similar for less educated men and women 
in this specification. 
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Figure 9 
When tests of a sequence of turnover choices are performed, however, the equality of 
the turnover behavior of less educated women compared to the other groups can still be 
rejected in the RE model. Three sequences of choices were considered. PJJ4 is the four 
24The joint probability in a model that allows correlation in the unobservables over time is the probability of a 
sequence of choices. Tests across groups for different choice sequences are presented below. 
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period sequence defined as stay on the current job for three periods and leave for a new job 
in the fourth period. PJNE4 is defined as stay on the job for three periods and leave for 
nonemployment in the fourth period. P84 is the sequence where the worker stays at the 
current job for all four periods. Tests for the equality of PJJ4, PJNE4, and P84 across groups 
were conducted. The equality of PJJ4 and PJNE4 for LHSF versus GHSM and GHSF is 
rejected at a significance level of 0.05. Equality is rejected for LHSF versus LHSM at a 
significance level of 0.10. The equality of these turnover probabilities for less educated 
men, more educated men, and more educated women cannot be rejected. 
As described in Section V, the unobservable random effects, µki, may be correlated 
with tenure on the job and labor market experience since tenure and experience result from 
previous turnover decisions. Such correlation between the unobservables and the explanatory 
variables causes biased estimates. One way to correct for this problem is to put some 
structure on the form of this correlation. I proceed by assuming that this correlation can be 




µJNEi=Ot.JNJ( +µ JNEi 
where µJJ is the random effect in the JJ equation, µ1NE is the random effect in the JNE 
equation, and µ' and µ' are random effects that are uncorrelated with the explanatoryJJ JNE 
variables. T. is the average tenure over the panel for worker i and .x. is the average level of
l l 
experience for worker i over the panel. A second set of RE estimations were performed that 
included average tenure as an explanatory variable in the JJ equation and average experience 
as an explanatory variable in the JNE equation. Likelihood ratio·tests rejected the 
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specification without these two variables in favor of their inclusion for all sex and education 
groups. As shown in Table IV, the estimates of the standard deviations of the random 
effects are similar in size to the estimates when the average values of tenure and experience 
are not included in the estimation. The estimated coefficient on average tenure is negative 
and significant as predicted for GHSM and GHSF but is insignificant for both LHSM and 
LHSF. The estimated coefficient on average experience is not significant for any group. 
The major difference between the 
estimates obtained in this model and those Job-to-Job Turnover MNP Esfimotes - RE, Means of X and T 
0.9 
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Figure 10, for three of the groups, I now 0 .§ o.3 
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w 0.2 
find rising job-to-job turnover with 0.1 
3 4 5 
tenure, conditional on the wage and the 
Tenure 
Figure 10individual's average level of job tenure 
over the panel. This is in accordance with the predictions of the matching model. 
Figure 11 illustrates that this RE specification also produces estimates for LHSF and 
LHSM that imply that the JNE turnover of these two groups is more similar than it looks in 
the models previously discussed. Hypothesis tests indicate that the equality of the PJJ4 (stay, 
stay, stay, JJ transition) probability sequence is still rejected for less educated women and the 
three other groups. However, PJNFA (stay, stay, stay, JNE transition) for LHSF is estimated 
25One-period probabilities were again calculated by evaluating the probabilities at the mean of the random 
effects and adjusting the one-period standard deviation to account for the additional variance term allowed in the RE 
specification. 
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with much less precision in this 
Job-to-Nonemployment Turnoverspecification26 making it impossible to MNP Esfimates - RE, Means of X and T 
0.14 
LHSM0.12reject equality for any pairwise -GHSM
0.1 
LHSFcomparison of the JNE probability 0.08 
GHSF 
0.06 
sequence for LHSF with the other groups. 
0.04 
Nonetheless, as a whole the RE 0.02 
3 4 
Tenureestimations do not change the conclusions 
Figure 11reached previously. Less educated 
women stand out as having different turnover patterns than more educated women or either 
group of men while the three other groups look substantially the same. 
VII. ESTTh1ATING THE RESERVATION WAGE 
In this section, I present an additional test of the equality of men's and women's 
turnover that focusses the analysis more precisely on job matching behavior. This is 
accomplished by testing whether or not the reservation wages and offers of the four groups 
are equal. As previously discussed, the job-to-job reservation offer and job-to­
nonemployment reservation wage are "trigger" wages. At a current wage below the JNE 
reservation wage the worker leaves the job for nonemployment. At or above that wage, he 
or she does not leave for nonemployment. The decision is made in the same way with the JJ 
reservation offer except that the transition under consideration is to a new job. In this 
26In this specification its standard error is 0.0211 versus a standard error of 0.0061 in the previous RE model. 
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section, I develop a method for estimating these reservation wages using the parameters 
estimated by multinomial probit. 
Before describing this estimation procedure in more detail some terms must be 
clarified. For simplicity, first consider an individual worker's problem in a deterministic set-
ting with no unobserved heterogeneity. The JNE reservation wage (wR ) is the wage that 
N 
triggers a decision to leave the current job for nonemployment. From equation (5), this 
trigger wage can be defined by setting the wage of individual i equal to that worker's 
reservation wage given that the two best of the three alternatives is either staying or moving 
to nonemployment:27 
Z N 'VN-wR (9)lt I - Nl/' 
Holding constant all other variables, wR . is the wage at which individual i at time t would
NII 
be indifferent between leaving employment and staying at the same job. 
The JJ reservation wage ( wR ) requires somewhat more clarification. The JJ turnover
J 
equation (3) is specified in terms of a reservation offer. The reservation offer is the offer at 
which the worker is just indifferent between taking a new job and staying on the old job. 
Clearly, however, as shown in equation (2), the reservation offer depends on the current 
wage. The JJ reservation wage is defined to be the value of the current wage that would 
shift the reservation offer to the point where the worker is indifferent between staying on the 
This condition is a result of the increase in complexity associated with a three state search and matching 
model as opposed to the two-state case. In the two-state case the JNE reservation wage is defined simply by 
equation (9) without the condition on the value of an alternative offer. A similar condition, which is described 
below, must be imposed when defining the JJ reservation wage. 
27
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job and taking a new job offer. The JJ reservation wage is simply a transformation of the 
reservation offer that allows one to consider the current wage, the JNE reservation wage, and 
the JJ reservation wage in the same dimension. Again considering the deterministic problem, 
the JJ reservation wage for individual i is defined by the following two equations. Setting 
the wage offer of individual i equal to the reservation offer of that individual (see equations 
(1) and (2)) yields the following: 
(10) 
A simple transformation to a JJ reservation wage as described above is obtained by rewriting 
equation (10) as 
(11) 
Holding all other variables constant and given that a new job and staying on the job rank 
above the nonemployment option, wR . is the trigger wage for a JJ transition for individual i
111 
at time t. 
Equation (9) and equation (11) and the stated conditions define the JNE and JJ 
reservation wages for individual i if no unobservable heterogeneity affects this worker's 
reservation offer or reservation wage. Incorporating such unobservable heterogeneity 
changes these definitions only slightly. Each of these reservation wages will now include a 
component that is known to the individual but unobservable to the econometrician. In this 
case equations (9) and (11) can be rewritten as 
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(12) 
for the job-to-nonemployment reservation wage and 
(13) 
for the job-to-job reservation wage. Allowing for a distribution of unobserved heterogeneity 
in the turnover equations across individuals generates a distribution of JJ and JNE reservation 
wages across individuals. 
If consistent estimates of the {3 and 'Y vectors were available and if E[cp -cl] =0 and 
E[o/h =0, then consistent estimates of wR . and wR . could be .:,btained by substituting theJ Nu Ju 
consistent estimates of {3 and 'Y into equations (9) and (11). As is well known, however, 
discrete choice models are identified only up to a scale parameter. Since this is a discrete 
choice problem, the scale of the multinomial probit estimates of {3 and 'Y is unidentified and 
an estimate of the two reservation wages cannot be obtained in fhe way just described. 
The scale problem associated with discrete choice models results from having data 
only on the alternative chosen and not on the level of the underlying utilities of the various 
alternatives. In terms of the discrete choice framework specified above in equation (6), this 
means knowing only that, say, (y1 > y2) and (y 1 > y3) but not the levels of y1, y2, or y3• 
The likelihood function of a discrete choice model must therefore be written in terms of the 
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probability of a particular alternative being chosen.28 The resulting estimates cannot 
therefore be used to predict the levels of y1, y2 , or y3 but can be used to predict the 
probability of a given alternative. 
Because of the discrete nature of the problem, in order to obtain estimates of the JJ 
and JNE reservation wages, these reservation wages must be interpreted in terms of turnover 
probabilities. In a manner somewhat analogous to the probit likelihood function, estimates of 
the two reservation wages can be expressed implicitly in terms of the turnover probabilities. 
To clarify this concept, let V s(Q) be the value of staying at the current job, Vn(Q) the value 
of leaving the job for a new job, and VJNe(Q) the value of leaving the current job for 
nonemployment for an individual with known characteristics Q. Equations (9) and (11) 
describe the deterministic world where, in order to solve for the reservation wages, we set 
Vs(Q)=Vn(Q) and Vs(Q)=VJNE(Q). Equations (12) and (13) describe a world with 
uncertainty where, in order to solve for the reservation wages, we set 
V5(Q)+ t =VJJ(Q)+ t and Vs(Q)+ t =YJNE(Q)+ t where t is the unobservablec;5 '>JJ ',,5 c;JNE '>k 
component of the value of alternative k to the individual. As just described, due to the 
nature of the problem, it is not possible simply .to solve these two equations for the 
reservation wages. Therefore I solve this problem by moving to probability space. Since the 
(s are continuous random variables, P(Vs(Q)+ ~s =Vn(Q)+ ~JJ·)=O and 
28For example, take a discrete choice problem with two alternatives. Worker i chooses the first alternative if 
yi=X/3 +Ei > 0. In this case define an index variable Di= 1. If the second alternative is chosen the inequality is 
reversed and Di=O. Let the sample consist of N individuals. Then the probit likelihood function for this problem is: 
N -X{3 -X{3IT [l-<P(-1-·)t'[<P(-1-·)f-D,>. Where <P is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and c, is 
n=I (J (J 
the standard deviation of E. 
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P(Vs(Q)+ ts =VJNiQ)+ t,NE)=O. However, I can reexpress this concept by setting 
Or in terms of the previous notation, the JJ reservation wage estimate will be defined 
by setting the probability of staying on the job equal to the probability of leaving for a new 
job: 
(14) 
And the JNE reservation wage estimate is defined by setting the probability of staying at the 
current job equal to leaving that job for nonemployment: 
(15) 
More concisely, equations (14) and (15) are written 
(16) 
where p , p , and p are defined as the probability of staying at the current job, the 
sray JJ JNE 
probability of leaving the job for a new job, and the probability of leaving the job for non­
employment and where A is a matrix of all explanatory variables except the wage (w), tenure 
_l. 
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(T), and experience (X). Given the estimated parameters from the MNP estimations, the 
probabilities that form these two equations can be calculated. This provides a mechanism for 
estimating the implied reservation wages. 29 
Actual estimates of wR and wR were obtained by a grid search procedure. Given 
J N 
the mean levels of the explanatory variables other than the wage, the three predicted 
probabilities p (w T X A) , fa (w T x A) , and p (w T x A) were calculated for each trial 
stay ' ' ' JJ ' ' ' JNE ' ' ' 
wage and a search procedure produced the two wages that most closely satisfied (16). 30 It 
can be seen from (16) that these estimates can be calculated for a series of tenure or 
experience levels, thereby creating estimated reservation wage-t~nure or wage-experience 
profiles. All variables other than the wage and either tenure or experience were held 
constant at the group averages in the calculations of the estimated probabilities. This 
procedure produces an estimated reservation wage or wage profile for the average individual 
in each group. I use these estimates to test the equality of the job matching behavior of men 
and women by education level. 
29This procedure depends crucially on the time interval during which offers are received and decisions made for 
identification of the levels of the reservation wages. If, for example, the time interval considered was one month 
rather than one year, it would take a smaller wage to equate the probability of staying on the job to the probability of 
leaving the job for a new job or for nonemployment. Nonetheless, the levels of the reservation wages that are 
implied are the same for the four groups. Therefore, tests of the equality of the reservation wage across groups 
remain valid despite this caveat. This procedure also depends on the assumption that the parameters of the model do 
not depend on wages -- an assumption that is also implicit in the maximum likelihood method used to obtain the 
MNP estimates. 
30Defined as equal to at least three decimal places. 
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Table V 
Estimated Reservation Wages 
by Sex and Education Group 
























*The calculation of the variance of the estimated reservation wage is 
described in footnote 32. 
**Adjusted by mean and standard deviation of the real wage by 
group. 
The estimated reservation wage and standard errors for the average member of each 
of the four groups is presented in Table V. 31 These estimates partially confirm the results 
outlined above that men and women with more than a high school education are similar in 
their turnover patterns. 32 The equality of the JJ reservation wage for GHS men and GHS 
The following section will discuss a possible source of bias which may cause these estimates of the reservation 
wage to be negative. I show in that section that despite this possible bias these estimates can be used to test for 
equality of the matching behavior of men and women. Because of this possible bias, however, I will not discuss the 
size of these estimates. The estimates of the reservation wage will be used solely to test for whether or not matching
behavior is equivalent for the four groups. 
32The variances of the reservation wage estimates were obtained using the "delta method." The expressions for 
the necessary derivatives of the reservation wage with respect to the MNP parameters were obtained by 
differentiation of the equations in (16). 
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women cannot be rejected while the equality of the JNE reservation wage for the two groups 
is rejected. Equality of the JJ and JNE reservation wages of less educated women with all 
other groups is strongly rejected. The same is true for less educated men. Once again, LHS 
women show the strongest differences from the other groups. In fact, at tenure levels of 
greater than three years no JJ reservation wage can even be calculated for this group. Given 
the MNP estimates for less educated women, there is no wage that equalizes the probability 
of staying on the job and the probability of leaving for a new job. This result might be 
interpreted to mean that one or more of the assumptions of the matching model that assure 
that the reservation wage property will hold are violated in the case of LHS women. 
VIII.POSSIBLE BIASES AND EFFECTS ON COMPARISONS BY GROUP 
A. SAMPLE SELECTION BIAS 
Through their neglect of sample selection, turnover studies implicitly assume that 
turnover from a job is independent of the probability of being in the sample. Since being in 
the sample is defined by a person's having a job, this assumption may not be very plausible. 
The assumption just described is harder to justify once individual random effects are 
introduced. In a 3-state case with random effects, the econometrician acknowledges the 
possibility of the persistence of unobservable individual heterog~neity over time in a worker's 
preferences for changing jobs, leaving for nonemployment, or staying on the same job. In 
order to avoid sample selection problems, however, no correlation can be allowed between 
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labor market entry or reentry decisions and current job turnover decisions. 33 In order to be 
confident that any differences in sample selection bias across groups do not change the 
conclusions put forward in this paper, I now present some evidence on the possible effects of 
such sample selection. 
The sample selection problem is that the JJ or JNE turnover probability conditional on 
a worker's being in the sample may not be equal to the unconditional JJ or JNE probability. 
This possibility seems particularly likely in the case of the JNE probability since one might 
expect that a person who is currently not employed has a higher propensity for choosing 
nonemployment than a person who is currently employed. Therefore, I will focus on 
possible sample selection bias in the estimated probability of JNE turnover. 
In the context of the comparison of men and women by education group undertaken in 
this paper, the most relevant aspect of the sample selection problem is whether or not sample 
selection bias differs by group. Although I cannot quantify the size of these possible biases, 
I can show the extent to which sample selection bias would have to differ by group in order 
to change the hypothesis test results presented above. 
By the laws of probability, 
33Also, with the introduction of such time-persistent unobservables the initial conditions problem will arise 
(Heckman [1981a]). It may be possible to solve the initial conditions problem in my case since this sample includes 
men and women who are young enough that I observe their entry into the labor market in which case the initial 
condition could be assumed to be exogenous. Initializing the process at this point, however, raises questions about 
endogenous sample selection when comparing workers of different education levels. 
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(17) 
when A and Bare two mutually exclusive and exhaustive events. Let A be the event of 
being in the sample and B be the event of not being in the sample. Ideally, I would test for 
the equality of p
JNE 
across groups. Instead I am able only to obtain group estimates of 
p
JNE 1 IA 
for each group. A sample selection bias in my group comparisons may occur if the 
difference between p ., and p varies across groups or if the probability of being in theIJNE 1A JNE 1B 
sample differs across groups. For example, one might speculate that P,NE'B is larger for 
I 
women than for men. Although I have no information on p , , I do have data on the
JNE 1B 
proportion of each sex and education group that is included in my sample of workers. These 
proportions can be used as estimates for P(A) and P(B). With estimates of p , P(A), and 
JNE 1 1A 
P(B),34 I can calculate how large the discrepancies in p NE'B would have to be by group in
1 I 
order to change the test results cited above. 
The most marginal test result in the tests comparing men and women is that between 
GHSM and GHSF in their JNE probability. I have substituted possible alternative values 
for P/:J1t1 and p/:Jlf~ into equation (17) to assess how strongly these unknown probabilities 
would have to differ in order to overturn the result that the JNE probability of more highly 
educated women is insignificantly different from that of more highly educated men. Such 
substitutions show that p/:Jf,f~ would have to be approximately 25 % larger than p/:J!,f1 in 
34Estimates of P(A) by group are as follows: LHSM 0.69; GHSM 0.81; LHSF 0.55; and GHSF 0.83. 
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order to reverse the hypothesis test results. Given the similarity of results found for these 
two groups throughout this paper, it seems unlikely that there exists a difference of this 
magnitude in the unknown p NE /s. Any modification in the results involving less educated
1 1 
women is even less likely since in this case the unknown pJ:Ji:~ would have to be 
approximately 20% smaller than the unknown p
1
~~~. I conclude, therefore, that it is 
unlikely that sample selection bias is causing incorrect results in my comparisons of the 
turnover probabilities of men and women. 
B. NEGLECT OF TIME PERSISTENT UNOBSERVABLES 
Two discrepancies with the formal matching model are found in the reservation wages 
reported in Table V and in reservation wage profiles that have been calculated as described 
above (but are not reported here). First, for most levels of tenure or experience the 
reservation wages by group are estimated to be negative. Second, as discussed in Section V, 
the prediction of the matching model is that the reservation wage path is increasing with 
tenure. The JJ reservation wage profiles implied by my estimates are found to be decreasing 
with tenure for each of the four groups. Both of these results may well be explained by the 
possible bias (discussed in Section V above) in the MNP parameter estimates used to 
generate these reservation wage profiles. In this section, I will discuss this possible source 
of bias, its potential affect on the reservation wage estimates, and, most importantly for the 
-- --
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goals of this paper, whether or not the possible bias is such that comparisons can still be 
made across groups. 35 
As discussed above, if E is positively correlated with tenure, it is expected that the
3 
coefficient on tenure in the third equation in (6), 03Y' will be biased upward. Now consider 
how this would affect estimates of the JJ reservation wage. The JJ reservation wage estimate 
is implicitly defined by the first equality in (16). By the implicit function rule, 
aPslay - aPJJ 
ao3 y ao3 y 





. aP,1 aP aP d aP,1 awR1 b . Th ..Smce __,_. < O _.!!:!!_ > O _.!!:!!_ > O, an , < 0 must e negative. e pos1t1ve a "R ,a"R , a~3 a~3 ' a~3WJ WJ Uy Uy Uy 
correlation of tenure with the unobservable E could therefore explain the negative estimates
3 
of the JJ reservation wage. 
An upward bias on the coefficient on tenure would also affect the prediction of the 
matching model that the reservation wage increases with tenure. Since 03 is the coefficient T 
on tenure, if 03 Y is biased upward then the bias in the estimates of the reservation wage will 
35The negative estimates of the reservation wages may also result from the problem described in footnote 29 
above. Since the level of the reservation wage estimates depends upon the time period of observation, the negative 
estimates may be caused by the level of detail available in the survey data. Note, however, that these reservation 
wage estimates are not unique in being affected by the time interval at which data are available. This is a pervasive 
problem in econometric estimation. Note also that, as stated in footnote 29, the levels of the reservation wages that 
are implied are the same for all four groups. Tests for equality of the reservation wages across groups are therefore 
not affected by this issue. 
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be a function of tenure. The direction of the possible bias is such that a reservation wage 
profile that is in fact upwardly sloping could be estimated to slope down with tenure. 
The question now is whether the comparisons across groups attempted in this paper 
can still be made if the bias just described does exist. Under the null hypothesis that the 
reservation wage of each group is the same, comparisons across groups can be made as long 
as the extent of the correlation between tenure and the unobservable is the same for each 
group. Given that the null hypothesis is that all other parameters of the problem are equal 
across groups, this seems like a reasonable assumption. Therefore, if the null hypothesis of 
equal matching behavior across groups is not rejected, these group comparisons are valid 
since any possible bias affecting one group would affect the other equally. If, however, the 
null is rejected, there is no evidence about the relative size of this potential bias across 
groups. In this case, equality of the estimated reservation wage profiles can be rejected but 
further comparisons cannot be made. 
The RE specification with the inclusion of average tenure and average experience 
discussed above is meant to correct the MNP estimates for the problem just described. It 
does not, however, fully solve the problem for the reservation wage estimates for the 
following reason. The method developed in this paper for estimating the reservation wages 
relies on one-period estimates of the probability of staying on the job, leaving for a new job 
and leaving the job for nonemployment. Yet the random effects model generates 
probabilities over a sequence of choices. In order to compare the reservation wage estimates 
under the RE specification to those without RE's, I again evaluated the probabilities at the 
mean level of the random effects and adjusted the (fixed) variance of the one-period errors to 
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account for the estimated variance of the random effects. I then calculated reservation wage 
estimates with these estimates. As predicted, these RE reservation wage estimates were, 
with two exceptions, greater than those reported in Table V above. The JJ reservation wages 
for GHSM and GHSF were in this case estimated to be positive.36 Standard errors cannot 
be calculated for these estimates since the estimates are calculated without taking into account 
that the variances of the RE's are estimated and not fixed. No firm conclusions can 
therefore be drawn from this set of reservation wage estimates. 37 
IX. CONCLUSION 
In summary, I conclude that more educated men and women do not differ 
significantly in their turnover behavior. This result is striking. The sample is young and the 
data is recent but an often observed and often assumed difference between the labor market 
behavior of men and women does not hold for this subset of men and women. Less educated 
men and women, on the other hand, differ significantly in their turnover behavior both from 
each other and from more highly educated members of their own sex. The strong 
differences in the job matching process of less educated women and all others is also an 
important observation. 
Interpretation of these results with respect to the unexplained gender wage gap poses a 
dilemma. Less educated women have the lowest median wages of the four groups under 
consideration. The wage gap between less educated men and women is also generally 
36The estimates were 1.27 and 0.23 for GHSM and GHSF respectively. 
37An alternative definition of the reservation wage might be devised based on the probability sequences relevant 
to the random effects model. 
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greater than that of more highly educated men and women. The results of this paper 
showing that the job matching behavior of less educated women differs significantly from all 
others might be taken as evidence that matching is an important contributor to this wage gap. 
On the other hand, the equality of the turnover patterns of women and men with greater than 
a high school education cannot be rejected. Yet the gender wage gap persists for this group 
as well. Job turnover cannot therefore provide an across-the-board explanation for the 
gender wage gap. 
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Appendix C: MNP Estimated Turnover Probabilities 
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Figure C3 
LHSM = Males, Less than or equal to high school education 
GHSM = Males, Greater than high school education 
LHSF = Females, Less than or equal to high school education 
GHSF = Females, Greater than high school education 
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Figure C6 
LHSM = Males, Less than or equal to high school education 
GHSM = Males, Greater than high school education 
LHSF = Females, Less than or equal to high school education 
GHSF = Females, Greater than high school education 
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Appendix C: MNP Estimated Turnover Probabilities 
Yearly Observations per Individual 
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MNP Estimates MNP Estimates 
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Figure C9 
LHSM = Males, Less than or equal to high school education 
GHSM = Males, Greater than high school education 
LHSF = Females, Less than or equal to high school education 
GHSF = Females, Greater than high school education 
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APPENDIX D- DATA APPENDIX 
The sample used in this thesis is the National Longitudinal Survey Youth (NLSY) 
cohort, a panel survey of 12,686 young men and women. The survey began in 1979 and 
continues annually. The 12,686 individuals of the NLSY are divided into three samples: a 
random sample, a poverty sample, and a military sample. Estimations were performed on 
the sample of NLSY young men and women over age 21 from the random sample for 
interview years 1980-1987. 
In addition to the usual demographic, family, and education data collected in such 
surveys, the NLSY records information on up to five jobs per year held by the individual. 
Detailed information including wage, hours worked, union status, industry, and occupation is 
available for each job. For each worker, I have tracked employers across interviews thereby 
creating a job history as well as a record of job turnover for each individual. 
This created job history assures that job-specific variables such as the wage and union 
status are correctly identified with the particular job. It avoids the problems that can be 
created by multiple job holders or job changers if the survey records only current information 
on one job or if no identification of the employer is available. The NLSY supplies the 
necessary information to track job-specific data. It should be noted, however, that the work 
history data supplied directly by the NLSY does not automatically track job-specific data with 
its categorization of jobs as Job #1, Job #2, etc. Job #1 in year t may be recorded as Job #2 
in year t+ 1. Therefore, with the employer identification provided, I have tracked job­
specific data across interview years. 
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In order to create a history of job turnover, it is also necessary to identify the "main 
job" for multiple job holders. The main job was identified as being that job on which the 
worker earned the most during that week. This classification of the main job suffers from 
the disadvantage that a temporary fluctuation in hours worked on a secondary job may cause 
that job to be temporarily classified as the main job. This would make it appear that the 
worker changed jobs during this period when he or she did not. Therefore, if a main job 
was interrupted for a period of one quarter or less, it is considered to be the main job 
throughout the period. A worker's recorded real wage in 1979 dollars must also be at least 
70 % of the minimum wage in 1979 in order to be included in the sample. This sample 
restriction and definition of job turnover follow closely that used in Topel [1986]. 
Means of the data are presented in the table below. Tenure is the number of years 
spent with the current employer. Experience is actual labor market experience calculated 
from detailed work history data of the individual up to the interview date. The real wage is 
the worker's wage adjusted by the CPI index so that all wages are in terms of 1979 dollars. 
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NLSY Random Sample 
Age 2 22, 1980-87 
Means by Sex and Education Level 
LHSM GHSM LHSF GHSF 
Tenure 1.98 1.67 1.94 1.75 
Experience 5.68 5.58 5.10 5.46 
Bad Health 
Dummy 
0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 
Union Dummy 0.24 0.13 0.17 0.14 
Real Wage 4.81 5.58 3.81 4.80 
Asset Income 0.20 0.57 0.21 0.37 
Marital Status 
Dummy 
0.43 0.29 0.56 0.36 
Number of 
Children 
0.61 0.19 0.85 0.23 
Local 
Unemployment 
Rate > 6% and 
:5 12% 
0.56 0.51 0.59 0.52 
Local 
Unemployment 
Rate > 12% 
0.16 0.10 0.14 0.11 
Number of 
Observations 
6018 4336 4792 5064 




Estimated Coefficients - MNP 
Job-to-Job Turnover Equation 
Children and Marital Status Included 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
LHSM GHSM LHSF GHSF 
Wage -0.120 -0.158 -0.191 -0.240 
(0.018) (0.015) (0.037) (0.020) 
Wage- 0.003 0.002 0.007 0.005 
squared (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.0004) 
Tenure -0.314 -0.172 -0.255 -0.083 
(0.041) (0.062) (Q,050) (0.055) 
Tenure- 0.016 0.005 0.016 -0.005 
squared (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) 
Experience -0.004 -0.097 0.103 0.058 
(0.055) (0.067) (0.062) (0.061) 
Experience- -0.007 0.001 -0.018 -0.009 
squared (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Bad Health 0. 131 -0.053 0.105 -0.129 
Dummy (0. 162) (0.208) (0.146) (0.181) 
Union -0.285 -0.185 -0.427 -0.471 
Dummy (0.072) (0.096) (0.095) (0.097) 
Asset Income 0.006 0.016 0.029 0.026 
% 1000 (0.020) (0.009) (0.021) (0.015) 
Marital Status -0.099 0.102 -0.200 -0.152 
Dummy (0.062) (0.078) (0.068) (0.069) 
Number of 0.083 0.057 -0.066 -0.145 
Children (0.034) (0.065) (0.034) (0.062) 
Local -0. 166 -0.164 -0.220 -0.206 
Unemployment Rate (0.061) (0.067) (0.073) (0.065) 
> 6% and ::; 12% 
Local -0.348 -0.282 -0.454 -0.453 
Unemployment Rate (0.089) (0.112) (0.112) (0.108) 
> 12% 
Constant 0.345 0.581 0.181 0.315 
(0. 156) (0.189) (0.194) (0. 185) 























> 6% and :::',; 12% 
Local 
Unemployment 




Estimated Coefficients - MNP 
Job-to-Nonemployment Turnover Equation 
Children and Marital Status Included 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
LHSM GHSM LMSF GHSF 
-0.086 -0. 152 -0. 162 -0.241 
(0.026) (0.017) (0.041) (0.020) 
0.002 0.002 0.005 0.005 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
-0.363 -0.259 -0.366 -0.223 
(0.048) (0.076) (0.049) (0.061) 
0.027 0.020 0.038 0.010 
(0.008) (0.015) (0.007) (0.011) 
-0.264 -0.311 -0. 178 -0.146 
(0.056) (0.075) (0.056) (0.068) 
0.009 0.013 0.002 0.003 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
0.179 0.063 0.238 0.209 
(0.174) (0.206) (0. 134) (0.173) 
-0.168 -0.095 -0.330 -0.333 
(0.075) (0. 106) (0.087) (0.100) 
0.018 0.027 .·0.053 0.046 
(0.015) (0.010) (0.020) (0.018) 
-0. 351 -0.272 0.072 0.070 
(0.067) (0.093) (0.065) (0.075) 
0.227 0.076 0.083 0.197 
(0.035) (0.078) 10.031) (0.059) 
0.071 0.091 -0.096 -0.249 
(0.069) (0.079) (0.070) (0.071) 
0.298 0. 155 -0.026 -0.218 
(0.091) (0. 120) (0.099) (0.107) 
0.649 0.880 0.696 0.720 
(0.160) (0.199) (0.175) (0.186) 




Estimated Coefficients - MNP 
Job-to-Job Turnover Equation 
Children and Marital Status Excluded 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
LHSM GHSM LHSF GHSF 
Wage -0.122 -0.156 -0.179 -0.236 
(0.018) (0.015) (0.036) (0.020) 
Wage-squared 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.005 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Tenure -0.320 -0.171 0.245 -0.089 
(0.041) (0.062) (0.049) (0.055) 
Tenure- 0.017 0.005 0.014 -0.005 
squared (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) 
Experience -0.009 -0.097 0.124 0.071 
(0.055) (0.067) (0.061) (0.060) 
Experience-squared -0.006 0.002 -0.020 -0.011 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Bad Health 0.131 -0.062 0.099 -0.148 
Dummy (0.162) (0.207) (0.147) (0.181) 
Union -0.282 -0.180 -0.420 -0.474 
Dummy (0.072) (0.096) (0.094) (0.096) 
Asset Income 0.006 0.016 0.022 0.022 
% 1000 (0.020) (0.009) (0.021) (0.014) 
Marital Status --- --- --- ---
Dummy 
Number of Children --- --- --- ---
Local -0.161 -0.158 -0.233 -0.224 
Unemployment Rate (0.061) (0.067) (0.072) (0.065) 
> 6% and ::; 12% 
Local -0.345 -0.276 -0.479 -0.477 
Unemployment Rate (0.088) (0.112) (0.112) (0.107) 
> 12% 
Constant 0.370 0.584 -0.067 0.230 
(0.155) (0.189) (0.184) (0.183) 






















> 6% and ~ 12% 
Local 
Unemployment 




Estimated Coefficients - MNP 
Job-to-Nonemployment Turnover Equation 
Children and Marital Status Excluded 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
LHSM GHSM LHSF GHSF 
-0.091 -0.157 -0.173 -0.246 
(0.026) (0.017) (0.040) (0.020) 
0.002 0.002 0.005 0.005 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
-0.379 -0.264 -0.370 -0.222 
(0.048) (0.075) (0.049) (0.061) 
0.028 0.020 0.039 0.012 
(0.008) (0.014) (0.007) (0.011) 
-0.282 -0.313 -+).203 -0.161 
(0.055) (0.075) (0.055) (0.067) 
0.011 0.013 0.004 0.005 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
0.179 0.081 0.240 0.217 
(0.171) (0.206) (0.134) (0.171) 
-0. 156 -0.088 -0.327 -0.323 
(0.075) (0.105) (0.086) (0.100) 
0.016 0.026 0.056 0.048 
(0.015) (0.010) (0.019) (0.016) 
--- --- --- ---
--- --- --- ---
0.085 0.087 -0.097 -0.225 
(0.068) (0.078) (0.070) (0.070) 
0.295 0.151 -0.019 -0.204 
(0.090) (0.119) (0.098) (0.108) 
0.713 0.887 0.919 0.817 
(0.160) (0.198) (0.160) (0.184) 
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